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A. Fahmi∗
Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (IPM) P. O. Box 19395-5531, Tehran, Iran
In this Paper, we investigate the security of Zhang, Li and Guo quantum key distribution via quantum encryp-
tion protocol [Phys. Rev. A64, 24302(2001)] and show that it is not secure against some of Eve’s attacks and
with the probability one half she gets all of keys without being detected by the two parties. The main defect in
this protocol is that there is an attack strategy by which Eve can change the previously shared Bell state between
Alice and Bob to two Bell states among herself and Alice and Bob. Hence, we show that with probability 1/d
its generalization to d-dimension systems is not secure and show that its extension to the case of more partners
based on the reusable GHZ states is not secure and with probability one half Eve gets all of keys without being
detected by the two parties. In what follows, we show how in going to higher dimensions those protocols can
be repaired.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
In a cryptography protocol, we discus the possibility that
two remote parties, conventionally called Alice and Bob, ex-
change a secret random key to implement a secure encryption-
decryption algorithm, without meeting each other. Once the
sharing is achieved, the two parties can secretly exchange a
message over the public channel by encrypting them with a
key with a length equal to the message. In the key distri-
bution with classical transmission lines, an eavesdropper can
freely sneak into the transmissions and monitor the informa-
tion. Thus the role of cryptography is to provide some math-
ematical procedure that makes it computationally difficult for
the eavesdropper to reproduce the key from the information
sent through the transmission lines. However, no existing
classical cryptosystems has proven to present sufficient diffi-
culty to an eavesdropper. In particular, it was shown that some
of them can be broken in principle by quantum computation
[1].
On the other hand, quantum mechanics (QM) and its funda-
mental concepts were previously restricted to clarify and de-
scribe very special issues of physics. Recently, these concepts
have been extensively used in such concrete problems as the
distribution of secure keys between two parties. In 1984, Ben-
nett and Brassard [2] proposed a way of distributing the keys
in a physically secure way, by using quantum physics. Their
protocol bears the acronym BB84, and was the first protocol
of quantum cryptography, but we shall use the more precise
name of quantum key distribution (QKD).
In 1991, Ekert [3] proposed a QKD protocol that used en-
tangled particles, and he stated that the violation of Bell’s in-
equality might be the physical principle that ensures security.
In the quantum mechanical approach to key distribution, se-
curity is based on the laws of QM and not on the unproven
complexity of a mathematical problem, as was the case with
the classical cryptography. In these protocols eavesdropping
by an Eve has been considered, and it has been shown that
they are secure against various types of Eve’s attacks (for a
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comprehensive review see [4]).
After the earlier QKD protocols, various extensions were
proposed, for example: a key distribution protocol in which
Alice distributes the key among N different Bobs, in such a
way that only with the participation of all m Bobs (m ≤ N)
the keys could be retrieved [5]. Continuous variable key dis-
tributions [6] are among these generalizations. QKD pro-
tocols have been demonstrated over the past fifteen years
through an ingenious series of experiments by several research
groups. Many encouraging experiments have demonstrated
QKD, some spanning more than a hundred kilometers through
optical fibers [7]. Hence, the possibility of a secure key distri-
bution in the presence of noisy channels and decoherence has
been considered [8].
Recently, a new approach to QKD was proposed by Zhang,
Li and Guo (ZLG) [9], in which they proposed a QKD proto-
col that uses a quantum key to encode and decode the classical
information by considering a previously shared reusable Bell
state which acts as the quantum key. In this paper, we show
that their protocol is insecure against Eve’s attack and with
a probability of 1/2, Eve can be informed of Alice and Bob
keys without being detected by them. Hence, we show that
their extensions to higher dimension [10] and quantum secret
sharing based on the reusable GHZ states [11], are not secure.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we briefly
review some properties of QKD protocols in which data ex-
change between Alice and Bob is done, using orthogonal
states. In Sec. III we review the original Zhang et al. pro-
tocol [9]. In Sec. IV we show that this the protocol is not
secure against some of Eve’s attacks. In Sec. V we show that
ZLG extension to higher dimensions, suggested by Karim-
ipour, Bahraminasab and Bagherinezhad (KBB) [10] is not se-
cure. In Sec. VI we present some modified protocols that are
not only secure against Eve’s attacks, but also our protocol has
simple QKD steps and any eavesdropping by Eve can be de-
tected by Alice and Bob. Hence, we show that ZLG protocol
can be repaired, if we go to higher dimensional shared EPR
states. In Sec. VII we show that quantum secret sharing based
on the reusable GHZ state among three parties, suggested by
Bagherinezhad and Karimipour (Bk) [11], is not secure and
we repair this protocol. Finally, in Sec. VIII we summarize
our results.
2II. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY BASED ON
ORTHOGONAL STATES
Security of quantum cryptosystems is guaranteed by the
two fundamental laws of QM, (i) no-cloning theorem of non-
orthogonal states in quantum mechanics, (ii) any measure-
ment on a system can cause a perturbation on it (wave func-
tion reduction). On the other hand, in addition to the above
basic principle, in a realistic QKD protocol, we mention some
conditions that should be satisfied by any QKD protocol. As
suggested by M. Nielsen [12], to get the best possible cryp-
tosystems, we need to have the following properties:
I) The theoretical basis must be entirely public;
II) Actual implementation should be widely and publicly
available;
III) There should be extended periods of testing real imple-
mentations.
In addition to the above conditions, any QKD protocol must
have the following property,
IV) If Alice and Bob detect the presence of Eve on the dis-
tributed keys, they should discard those keys and must apply
their protocol to other states, and in this new use of the proto-
col they must detect the existence of Eve again.
Although, systems obeying these properties don’t necessar-
ily have security, they have preconditions for being secure. A
simple scheme was proposed by Bennett [2], which uses only
two nonorthogonal states. In this method, nonorthogonal en-
coding of the bit of information inevitably leads to the waste
of a portion of photons.
In contrast to these schemes that use nonorthogonal states,
some deterministic quantum cryptography schemes, based on
orthogonal states, have been proposed [13, 14, 15]. Gold-
enberg and Vaidman (GV) [13] and consequently, Koashi and
Imoto (KI) [14] have presented a quantum cryptography based
on orthogonal states. The basic technique is to split the trans-
fer of one bit of information into two steps, ensuring that only
a fraction of the bit of information is transmitted at a time.
Then the no-cloning theorem of orthogonal states [16] guar-
antee its security. Cabello presented a protocol [15] based on
GV and KI protocols and on the idea of using a larger alpha-
bet that saturates the capacity of the quantum channel. He
has introduced a key distribution protocol which works in the
Holevo limit [15]. After this paper, some people attempted
to get Holevo limit by using another approach [17, 18, 19].
Recently, some people [20, 21] have used non-local variables,
firstly introduced by Bennett et al. [22], to propose protocols
for QKD. These state, which are the product of two states can-
not be distinguished through the use of local operations and
(unlimited) classical two-way communications (LOCC).
Hence, Zhang et al. [9] presented another QKD scheme
that uses a quantum key to encode and decode the classical in-
formation, and the previously shared reusable EPR state acts
as the quantum key. They called it channel encrypting QKD.
This protocol can be used for quantum secure direct commu-
nication, and was proposed and pursued by some groups [23].
One of the best properties of QKD with orthogonal states
is that we don’t use any classical communication (although,
earlier versions didn’t have this property), because of the lack
of classical communications, Eve has minimum information
about the secret keys that are shared by Alice and Bob. Hence
in this protocol, we make use of the total dimension of Hilbert
space. Thus, the security of protocol can be enhanced. In what
follows, we restrict ourself to protocols haveing no decoher-
ence effects and in which all of the parties and eavesdropping
operations are exact and the environment doesn’t interact with
our system.
III. ZLG PROTOCOL
In the Zhang et al. protocol [9], Alice and Bob have pre-
viously shared some quantity of the Bell pairs, serving as the
quantum key
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
[|00〉AB + |11〉AB] (1)
When the process begins, the two parties rotate their particle’s
state by angle θ, respectively. The rotation can be described
by
R(θ) =
(
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
)
(2)
The state |Φ+〉 does not change under bilateral operation of
R(θ). The purpose of this operation is to prevent the other
parties from eavesdropping. Then Alice selects a value of a bit
(0 or 1) and prepares a carrier particle γ in the corresponding
state |ψ〉 (|0〉 or |1〉), randomly. The classical bit and the state
|ψ〉 are only known by Alice herself. Alice uses the particle
A of the entangled pairs and γ in state |ψ〉 to do a controlled-
NOT (CNOT) operation (A is the controller and γ is the target)
and the three particles will be in a GHZ state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|000〉ABγ + |111〉ABγ], when |ψ〉 = |0〉(3)
or
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|001〉ABγ + |110〉ABγ], when |ψ〉 = |1〉(4)
Then, she sends γ to Bob. Bob uses his corresponding particle
B to do a CNOT operation on γ again (B is the controller and
γ is the target). Now the key particlesA andB and the carrier
particle γ are in the same state as the initial state:
|Ψ′〉 = |Φ+〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 (5)
Bob measures γ and gets the classical bit corresponding to
the state |ψ〉. Zhang et al. considered some of Eve’s eaves-
dropping strategies, for example, they showed that Eve can
intercepts the particle γ that Alice sends to Bob and uses her
own particle (in the states |0〉 or |1〉) to do a CNOT operation
(her own particle is the target and γ is the controller). Then,
Eve sends γ to Bob. After Bob’s decoding operation, Eve’s
particle is entangled with the key. It seems that Eve can use
3FIG. 1: A F-type attack on ZLG protocol for quantum encryption of
keys. (a) With the choice of appropriate bases, Eve can change the
previously shared Bell pairs |Φ+〉AB between Alice and Bob to (b)
two similar Bell states between her and Alice and Bob (b).
her particle to decode Alice’s particle as Bob does. To de-
tect this eavesdropping strategy, they suggested that Alice and
Bob should do a bilateral rotation R(θ) on the key (EPR pairs
in the state |Φ+〉) before Alice does the CNOT operation for
second γ particle. Zhang et al. showed that the error rate
of the bit that Alice sends to Bob will be 2 cos2 θ sin2 θ. So
if θ = pi
4
, the error rate caused by eavesdropping will reach
1
2
. Then they concluded that communication parties can se-
lect θ = pi
4
as the bilateral rotation angle in every round and
Eve cannot get any useful information of the bit string they
transmit. Then, they considered a more realistic quantum op-
eration and transition through noisy channels and showed that
their protocol was robust.
IV. EVE’S ATTACK
In this section, we would like to show that ZLG protocol is
not secure against the use of a special strategy for eavesdrop-
ping.
The eavesdropping strategy is illustrated in Fig.(1).
According to Fig.(1), if Eve can transform previously
shared entangled state |Φ+〉AB between Alice and Bob to
|Ψi〉AE |Ψi〉EB , where |Ψi〉 are Bell states:
|Φ±〉 = |00〉 ± |11〉
|ψ±〉 = |01〉 ± |10〉
then, she can take all of keys that Alice sends to Bob. Here, we
consider a simple case that the rotating angle by Alice and Bob
for the security of QKD protocol is equal to θ = pi
4
, as a choice
by ZLG protocol (with a simple change in our approach, it can
be applied to any arbitrary rotation angle θ; although, some
authors consider Hadamard transformation for their operation
in higher dimensions [10] and more than two parties [11]).
Eve’s strategy can be described as follows:
1) Alice uses the particle A of the entangled pairs and γ1
in state |ψ〉 (|0〉 or |1〉) to do a CNOT operation (A is the con-
troller and γ1 is the target) and the three particles will be in a
GHZ (eqs. 3, 4) state. Then, she sends γ1 to Bob.
2) Eve intercepts particle γ1 and does a measurement in
the z bases (|0〉, |1〉) on it. Eve knows that Alice and Bob
entangled states |Φ+〉AB reduce to |00〉AB or |11〉AB .
3) Eve sends a particle γ1 to Bob. Bob uses his correspond-
ing particle B to do a CNOT operation on γ1 (B is the con-
troller and γ1 is the target). Bob measures γ1 and will get the
classical bit corresponding to the state |ψ〉. Alice and Bob can
not detect Eve’s operation in this step.
4) Alice and Bob apply the operation of R(pi
4
) on the their
particles states. Alice chooses another particle γ2 (|0〉 or |1〉)
and does a CNOT operation on it (A is the controller and γ2 is
the target), and sends γ2 to Bob.
5) Eve intercepts and keeps particle γ2 to herself. Thus, Eve
has a share on the Bell state between herself and Alice.
6) Eve prepares a maximally entangled state |Φ+〉1,2 and
sends particle 2 to Bob. At this stage, the common state
among them is:
|Ψ1〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)Aγ2(|00〉+ |11〉)1,2(|0〉 − |1〉)B
for |Φ+〉AB reduces to |11〉AB and |γ2〉 = |1〉, or
|Ψ2〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)Aγ2(|00〉+ |11〉)1,2(|0〉 − |1〉)B
for |Φ+〉AB reduces to |00〉AB and |γ2〉 = |0〉, or
|Ψ3〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)Aγ2(|00〉+ |11〉)1,2(|0〉+ |1〉)B
for |Φ+〉AB reduces to |00〉AB and |γ2〉 = |1〉, or
|Ψ4〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉)Aγ2(|00〉+ |11〉)1,2(|0〉+ |1〉)B
for |Φ+〉AB reduces to |11〉AB and |γ2〉 = |0〉
7) Bob takes particle 2 and uses particles B and 2 to do a
CNOT operation (B is the controller and 2 is the target). Here,
common state is:
|Ψ1〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)Aγ2{(|00〉 − |11〉)1B|0〉2 + (|01〉 − |10〉)1B|1〉2}
or
|Ψ2〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)Aγ2{(|00〉 − |11〉)1B|0〉2 + (|01〉 − |10〉)1B|1〉2}
or
|Ψ3〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)Aγ2{(|00〉+ |11〉)1B|0〉2 + (|01〉+ |10〉)1B|1〉2}
4or
|Ψ4〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉)Aγ2{(|00〉+ |11〉)1B|0〉2 + (|01〉+ |10〉)1B|1〉2}
8) Bob does a measurement on the particle 2 in the z bases
(|0〉, |1〉). With the probability of one-half, the above states
reduce to:
|Ψ1〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)Aγ2(|00〉 − |11〉)1B
or
|Ψ2〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)Aγ2(|01〉 − |10〉)1B
or
|Ψ3〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)Aγ2(|00〉+ |11〉)1B
or
|Ψ4〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉)Aγ2(|01〉+ |10〉)1B
At this stage, Eve shares two similar Bell states between her-
self on the one hand, and Alice and Bob on the other hand.
Thus, for the next rounds of the protocol Eve can take all of
keys that encrypted by Alice to |ψ〉Aγ2 state and she sends
those keys to Bob by encryption to |ψ〉1B , without being de-
tected by them.
9) For the next rounds of the ZLG protocol, in the cases
of |Ψ1〉, Eve gets the results |γn + 1〉 (|γn〉) for n odd (even)
sequences of Alice and Bob results and viceversa for |Ψ4〉.
Hence, in the case of |Ψ2〉 (|Ψ3〉), Eve gets the results of
|γn+1〉 (|γn〉) for all of n sequences of Alice and Bob results.
However, when Alice and Bob compare a subsequence of the
data bits publicly to detect eavesdropping, Eve leaks useful
information for correcting her results. More specifically, for
any odd (even) numbers of data bit that is announced by Alice
and Bob, Eve can determine which of the four possible |Ψi〉
states is common among them. By this means, Eve can obtain
all of numbered data bits completely, without being detected
by Alice and Bob.
10) Thus, with the probability 1
2
, Eve can get favorable re-
sults. In other cases (with the probability 1
2
), the Alice and
Bob can detect Eve’s attack. In other word, in any two rounds
of the experiment, Eve can hope to get keys in one of them.
Recently, Gao et al. [24] (GGWZ) showed that ZLG pro-
tocol and its extensions are not secure. They presented an
eavesdropping strategy which allows Eve to obtain half of the
data bits without being detected by the communicating par-
ties. Thus, they concluded that use of Hadamard gate or rota-
tion by θ = pi
4
, on each shared qubit is not effective in prevent
eavesdropping. This eavesdropping strategy is very simple
and Alice and Bob can detect the effect of Eve by a simple
change of their protocol. As authors suggested their eaves-
dropping can be removed by the choice of another rotation
angle for R(θ) (θ 6= pi
4
), by Alice and Bob. Hence, the parties
can consider other states such as:
|ψ0〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, |ψ1〉 = β|0〉 − α|1〉,
〈ψi|ψj〉 = δi,j i, j = 1, 2 (6)
as the carrier state in the ZLG protocol, where α and β are real
variables with the properties: α 6= β, α, β 6= 0 and α2+β2 =
1. Their protocol would be secure against of GGWZ attack
[24] and Alice and Bob can use Hadamard or R(θ) = pi
4
as
their operations. If we follow the ZLG protocol with the above
set of states, after Alice operation (by choosing ψ0 as carrier),
we have:
|Ψ〉 =
√
1
2
[|00〉|ψ0〉+ |11〉(2αβ|ψ0〉+ (β2 − α2)|ψ1〉)] (7)
This state has an interesting property: carrier states corre-
sponding to states |00〉 and |11〉 are not orthogonal to each
other, and Eve can not perfectly entangle her state to those of
Alice and Bob. Thus, for every round of the protocol, Eve
makes some errors on parties’ measurement results. With at-
tention to the aforementioned strategy for the protection of the
ZLG protocol against the GGWZ attack, in the following, we
don’t consider this eavesdropping strategy for our proposed
protocols which repair ZLG, KBB and Bk protocols.
Hence, it is not complicated to show that, in our approach
to Eve’s eavesdropping strategy, it is not important whether
Alice and Bob take an arbitrary rotation angle θ or use states
of equation (6). In both cases, Eve can still take an appropri-
ate rotation angle and measurement bases that help her to do
eavesdropping.
V. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION FOR D-LEVEL
SYSTEMS WITH GENERALIZED BELL STATES
Recently, Karimipour et al. [10] extended ZLG protocol to
d-level systems. Their protocol is based on shared entangle-
ment of a reusable Bell state. The security against some indi-
vidual attacks is proved, where the information gain of Eve is
zero and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by her
intervention is (d − 1)/d. However, in this section we show
that Eve can attack by a special strategy to get, with probabil-
ity 1/d, all of keys without being detected by Alice and Bob.
For convenience, we use the same notations as in [10]. Let
us first give a brief description of the QKD protocol involved
here. At the beginning, Alice and Bob share a generalized
Bell state:
|ψ00〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j〉a,b (8)
The qudit to be sent is denoted by q, which is encoded as a
basis state |q〉k. They defined controlled-right and controlled-
left shift gates that play the role of controlled-NOT gate, and
5act as follows:
Rc|i, j〉 = |i, j + i〉, Lc|i, j〉 = |i, j − i〉 (mod d) (9)
Alice performs a controlled- right shift on |q1〉k and thus en-
tangles this qudit to the previously shared Bell state, produc-
ing the state:
|Φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1 + j〉a,b,k (10)
Then, she sends the qudit to Bob. At the destination, Bob
performs a controlled-left shift on the qudit and disentangles
it from the Bell stae, hence revealing the value of q with
certainty. To protect this protocol against a specific kind of
attack, Alice and Bob proceed as follows. Before sending
each of the qudits, Alice and Bob act on their shared Bell
state by the Hadamard gates H and H∗, which are defined as
H = 1√
d
∑d−1
k,l=0 e
i2pi
d
kl|l〉〈k|, respectively. The key point is
that a Bell state |ψ0,0〉 disentangled from the outside world is
unchanged under this operation, while a state entangled with
outside is not:
H ⊗H∗|ψ0,0〉 = |ψ0,0〉. (11)
Eve’s strategy is similar to that in the previous section and
can be described as follows:
1) Alice uses the particle a of the entangled pairs and q1 in
state |q1〉 to do a controlled- right shift on it to produce the
state (eq. 10) . Then, she sends q1 to Bob.
2) Eve intercepts particle q1 and does a measurement in the
z basis on it. Eve knows that Alice, Bob and particle q1 states
reduce to |j, j, q1 + j〉a,b,k where j = 0, ...d− 1.
3) Eve sends particle q1 to Bob. Bob uses his corresponding
particle b to do a controlled-left shift on the q1. Bob measures
q1 and gets the classical dit corresponding to state the |q1〉. At
this stage, Alice and Bob can not detect Eve’s operation.
4) Alice and Bob apply the operations H and H∗ on the
their particle states.
H |j〉a = 1√
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
e
i2pi
d
kl|l〉〈k|j〉a = 1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
e
i2pi
d
jl|l〉a
H∗|j〉b = 1√
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
e−
i2pi
d
kl|l〉〈k|j〉b = 1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
e−
i2pi
d
jl|l〉b
5) Alice chooses another particle q2 and performs a
controlled- right shift on |q2〉k and sends q2 to Bob.
1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
e−
i2pi
d
jl|l〉a|q2 + l〉k
6) Eve intercepts and keeps particle q2 to herself, thus, Eve
has a share on the Bell state between herself and Alice. Eve
prepares a maximally entangled state 1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 |k, k〉1,2 and
sends particle 2 to Bob.
7) Bob takes particle 2 and uses particles b and 2 to do a
controlled-left shift on it
1√
d
d−1∑
l,k=0
e−
i2pi
d
jl|l〉b|k〉1|k − l〉2
Bob does a measurement on the particle particle 2 in the z ba-
sis. With the probability of 1/d, we have q2 = k − l. Thus, at
this stage, Eve shares two similar Bell states between herself
on the one hand and Alice and Bob on the other hand.
1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
e
i2pi
d
jl|l〉a|q2 + l〉k 1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
e−
i2pi
d
jl|l〉b|q2 + l〉1
8) For the next rounds of KBB protocol, in the case of the
above state, Eve gets the results |qn− j〉 (|qn− q2〉) for n odd
(even) sequences of Alice and Bob results for fix amount of
j = 0, ...d − 1 and q2 = 0, ..., d − 1. However, when Al-
ice and Bob compare a subsequence of the data dits publicly
to detect eavesdropping, Eve leaks useful information for cor-
recting her results. More specifically, for any odd (even) num-
bers of data dit that is announced by Alice and Bob, Eve can
determine which of the d possible states is common among
them. By this means, Eve can obtain all of numbered data dits
completely without being detected by Alice and Bob.
9) Thus, with the probability 1
d
, Eve can get favorable re-
sults. In other cases (with the probability d−1
d
), Alice and Bob
can detect Eve’s attack.
VI. NEW AND SECURE ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL
In the preceding section, we showed that ZLG protocol for
EPR pairs acting as the quantum key to encode and decode the
classical cryptography is not secure against a specific eaves-
dropping attack, the F-type attack. In this section we suggest
three modified protocols which are secure against F-type at-
tack. Those protocols have some basic properties, a) the pre-
viously shared Bell state is the main element of protocol, b)
Alice and Bob use all Hilbert space dimension communicat-
ing particle (γ) and all rounds of the protocol. c) parties don’t
have classical communication.
In what follows, we first suggest two QKD protocol basis
on the reusable Bell state, but parties use classical communi-
cation, in the tertiary protocol, we derive a efficient and secure
QKD without classical communication.
A. ZLG Protocol with Classical Communication
In this protocol, we let Alice and Bob to have classical com-
munications. The basic idea of our modification consists of
the following steps:
1) Alice and Bob want to shareN secure bits between them-
selves. They have previously shared some quantity of the Bell
pairs |Φ+〉AB . When the process begins, the two particles ro-
tate their state by the angle θ = pi
4
, respectively.
62) Alice randomly selects the value of a bit (0 or 1) (to-
taly 3N bits, N for message-coding and 2N for checking se-
quences) and prepares a carrier particle γ in the corresponding
states |ψ〉 (|0〉 or |1〉). The classical bit and the state |ψ〉 are
only known by Alice herself.
3) Alice randomly selects one of the following manners to
send the qubit |ψ〉,
i) She uses the particle A of the entangled pairs and γ in
state |ψ〉 to do a CNOT operation (A is the controller and γ is
the target) and callsN qbits of it message-coding andN qbits,
checking.
ii) She operates with a R(pi
4
) on the particle A of the entan-
gled pairs and takes the particle γ in state |ψ〉 to do a CNOT
operation (A is the controller and γ is the target) and calls it
the checking (N qbit) sequence. Then, she sends γ to Bob.
Alice keeps the arrangement of her choices to herself.
4) After Bob receives the particle γ in the case of ii (check-
ing sequence) Alice informs Bob about her R(pi
4
) operation
and Bob operates R(pi
4
) on the his qubit B. Then, he uses his
corresponding particle B to do a CNOT operation (B is the
controller and γ is the target). Bob measures γ and gets the
classical bit corresponding to the state |ψ〉. They keep mea-
surement results on γ to themselves.
5) In the cases (i) Alice doesn’t send any classical informa-
tion to Bob, and Bob uses his corresponding particleB to do a
CNOT operation (B is the controller and γ is the target). Then
Bob measures γ and gets the classical bit corresponding to the
state |ψ〉.
6) After the transmission of 3N bit sequence, Alice in-
forms Bob about her choices sequence for checking qubits
(2N qubits). They compare their results to check eavesdrop-
ping. If the error rate in this checking is below a certain thresh-
old, then, they can take message-coding qubits (N qubits) as
raw keys.
B. ZLG Protocol with Direct Communication
At this stage, we represent another protocol with the same
result as that of the previous approach. The first and second
steps of this protocol are similar to the previous one and we
replace the third and fourth steps as follows:
3′) Alice randomly selects one of the following manners,
i) She uses the particleA of the entangled pairs and γ in the
state |ψ〉 as does a CNOT operation (A is the controller and γ is
the target) and calls it message-coding (N qbits) and checking
(N qbits).
ii) She doesn’t do any operation on the γ and calls it the
checking (N qbits) sequence. Then, she sends γ to Bob. Alice
keeps the arrangement of her choices to herself.
4′) After Bob receives the particle γ in the case of ii (check-
ing sequence), Alice informs Bob not to do any operation on
γ. Thus, Bob measure γ and gets the classical bit correspond-
ing to the state |ψ〉. They keep the measurement results on γ
to themselves.
The fifth and sixth steps are the same as in the previous
protocol.
C. ZLG Protocol with the Use of Higher Dimensional Bell
States
In the Two previous QKD protocols, Alice and Bob re-
stricted themselves to have two different types of states for
security and some classical communication for some rounds
of the protocol. At this subsection, we suggest the new proto-
col that doesn’t use classical communication (as the original
ZLG protocol). Every repairing of ZLG protocol must have
three basic properties,
I) Parties don’t have classical communication,
II) Uses previously shared reusable Bell state,
III) Uses orthogonal state as carrier.
With the analysis of our eavesdropping attack, the main de-
fect of ZLG protocol is the reduction of Bell pairs to product
state by Eve’s measurement on the carrier particle. Thus, we
choose some entangled state which doesn’t have this prop-
erty. For example, we consider higher dimensional systems
for sharing Bell states that don’t reduce to a product state un-
der Eve’s measurement.
In what follows, we need to define the controlled gate Uc
between one qudit (as controller) and one qubit (as target).
Similar to KBB protocol [10], we consider the controlled Uc
that acts on the second qubit, conditioned on the first qudit,
and defined as:
Uc|i〉d ⊗ |j〉2 = |i〉d ⊗ U i|j〉2 (12)
In the above relation subscripts of the state vectors represent
the dimension of Hilbert space corresponding to each particle,
and U = σx for the spin half target particles. Thus, for i even
(odd) target state changes to |j〉2 (|j + 1〉2).
In our protocol, Alice and Bob have previously shared some
quantity of the Bell pairs, serving as the quantum key
|ψ0,0〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j, j〉AB (13)
When the process begins, the two parties operate Hadamard
gate on the their particle’s state which were defined in the sec.
III. The state |ψ0,0〉 does not change under a bilateral opera-
tion. Then Alice selects a value of a bit (0 or 1) and prepares
a carrier particle γ in the corresponding state |q〉 (|0〉 or |1〉),
randomly. The classical bit and the state |q〉 are only known to
Alice herself. Alice uses the particle A of the entangled pairs
and γ in state |q〉 to do a controlled gate Uc operation and the
three particles will be in state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
D


∑
jeven=0
|j, j, q〉ABγ +
∑
jodd=1
|j, j, q + 1〉ABγ


(14)
Then she sends γ to Bob. Bob uses his corresponding particle
B to do a controlled gate Uc operation on γ again. Now the
key particlesA andB and the carrier particle γ are in the same
state as the initial state:
7|Ψ′〉 = |ψ0,0〉AB ⊗ |q〉γ (15)
Bob measures γ and gets the classical bit corresponding to the
state |q〉.
At the intermediate stage of eq.(14), if Eve intercepts par-
ticle γ and does a measurement in the z basis (|0〉, |1〉) on
it, |Ψ0,0〉AB reduces to |ψeven0,0 〉 =
∑
jeven=0
|j, j〉AB or
|ψodd0,0 〉 =
∑
jodd=1
|j, j〉AB . Thus, Eve can’t disentangle
Alice and Bob states, if Alice and Bob apply Hadanmard
transformation on the their states (for example we consider
|ψeven0,0 〉), we have:
H ⊗H∗|ψeven0,0 〉 =
∑
l1,l2
∆(li, d)|l1, l2〉AB (16)
In the above equation ∆(li, d) = δ(l1 − l2) + δ(l1 − l2 −
d) + δ(l1 − l2 + d) and we restrict ourselves to D = 2d (even
dimensional Hilbert space). Thus, the above state reduces to∑
l |l〉A[|l〉B+|l+d〉B+|l−d〉B ] =
∑
l |l〉A[|l〉B+2|l+d〉B].
By noting the above state, Eve can do any operation on the
carrier state γ, for every cases. Alice and Bob have a chance
to detect Eve’s operation in the next rounds of protocol. From
the aforementioned reasons, we can deduce that the F-attack
does not apply to this approach, Eve can only entangle her
state with Alice and Bob states and she wishes that after her
operation and parties operation, Alice and Bob can not detect
her effects. This strategy is the same as GGWZ attack which
we have shown to be removable easily.
Generalizing this approach to the KBB protocol is simple,
we consider carrier states in the k-dimensional Hilbert space
and shared Bell state in the D-dimensional Hilbert space. We
divide the D-dimensional Hilbert space to k sections, where
any section has d elements (D = kd), similar to KBB proto-
col. Alice performs a controlled-right shift on |r1〉k and thus
entangles this qudit to the previously shared Bell state, pro-
ducing the state:
|Φ〉 = 1√
D


∑
j0
|j0, j0〉|r1 + j0〉+ ...+
∑
ji
|ji, ji〉|r1 + ji〉+ ...+
∑
jk−1
|jk−1, jk−1〉|r1 + jk−1〉

 (17)
In the above relation, |r1 + ji〉 calculated at mod k and
summation on the ji represent one set of j’s which run as
{i, i + k, ..., i + (d − 1)k} (0  i  k − 1). Alice then
sends the qudit to Bob. At the destination, Bob performs a
controlled-left shift on the qudit and disentangles it from the
Bell state, hence revealing the value of q with certainty. Simi-
lar to the usual manner, Alice and Bob act on their shared Bell
state by the Hadamard gates H and H∗.
At the intermediate stage of eq.(17), If Eve intercepts parti-
cle r in the intermediate cases and does a measurement in the
z base on it, then, |Ψ0,0〉AB reduce to |ψi0,0〉 =
∑
ji
|ji, ji〉
0  i  k − 1. Thus, Eve can’t disentangle Alice and Bob
states and F-attack doesn’t apply to this approach again. Al-
though, Alice and Bob can not detect Eve’s operation, but,
after Hadamard transformation by parties, the shared state is
transform to:
|Φ〉 =
∑
l
|l〉 {|l − (k − 1)d〉+ ...+ |l − d〉+ |l〉 (18)
+|l+ d〉+ ...+ |l + (k − 1)d〉}
=
∑
l
|l〉 {|l〉+ 2|l+ d〉+ ...+ 2|l + (k − 1)d〉} .
It can be shown that for every round of the protocol, Alice
and Bob have a chance to detect Eve’s operation. Although,
GGWZ [24] attack still exists for this generalization, based on
what we did in sec. III, we can use other states as carriers, to
get secured against GGWZ attacks.
VII. NON-SECURITY OF QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
BASED ON REUSABLE GHZ STATES
In a recent paper [11], Bagherinzhad and Karimipour (BK)
proposed a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable
GHZ states. The security against both intercept-resend strat-
egy and entangle-ancilla strategy was proved. However, here
we show that with the help of our intercept-resend strategy,
Eve can obtain all of the data bits with probability 1
2
with-
out being detected by the communication parties. For conve-
nience, we use the same notations as in Ref.[11].
The eavesdropping strategy is illustrated in Fig.(2). Ac-
cording to Fig.(2), if Eve can transform the previously shared
entangled state |GHZ〉abc among Alice, Bob ad Charlie to
|Ψi〉ae1 |Ψi〉be2 |Ψi〉ce3 , then, she can take all of keys that Al-
ice sends to Bob and Charlie, where |Ψi〉 are Bell states. Now
let us give an explicit description of Eve’s strategy.
1) In the beginning, Alice, Bob and Charlie have a pervi-
ously shared GHZ state which we denote by
|G〉abc := 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)abc (19)
and the data bits Alice wants to distribute to Bob and Charlie
can be represented by q1, q2, q3, ..., qn.
2) Alice prepares the state |qq〉12 (corresponding to classi-
cal bit q1) and entangles this state to the already present GHZ
state by performing CNOT gatesCa1Ca2 (as defined at the KB
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|G〉abc|qq〉12 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)abc|q, q〉12 (20)
to produce the state
|Φodd〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉abc|q, q〉12 + |111〉abc|q + 1, q + 1〉12)
(21)
and she sends the coded state to Bob and Charlie.
3) Eve intercepts first to send qubits and performs a mea-
surement on them in the z bases (|0〉, |1〉). Thus, the carrier
state reduces to
|Φodd〉1 = |000〉abc|q, q〉12 (22)
or
|Φodd〉2 = |111〉abc|q + 1, q + 1〉12 (23)
Then, she resends the encoded states to Bob and Charlie. Bob
and Charlie act on this state by the operators Cb1 and Cc2
and extract the state |q, q〉12. At this moment, parties can
not detect Eve’s operation. In what follows, we only consider
the |Φodd〉1 state (a similar approach can be consider for the
|Φodd〉2 state).
4) Alice, Bob and Charlie apply Hadamard operationH on
the their particle states. Then, for the even bits, which are
encoded as states |q〉, i.e., (|0〉 = (1/√2)(|00〉 + |11〉 and
|1〉 = (1/√2)(|01〉 + |10〉), Alice entangles this state to the
shared state by performing only one single CNOT gate Ca1 on
the |q〉 to produce the state:
1√
2
(|0〉a|q〉+ |1〉|a1 + q〉) 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)b 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)c
Alice sends the coded state to Bob and Charlie.
5) Eve intercepts and keeps sending qubits to herself. Thus,
she has shared the |0〉a|q〉+ |1〉|1 + q〉a state between herself
and Alice.
6) Eve prepares two maximally entangled state (|00〉 +
|11〉)34(|00〉 + |11〉)56 and sends qubits 4 and 6 to Bob and
Charlie respectively. At this stage, the common state between
them is:
1√
2
(|0〉a|q〉+ |1〉|a1 + q〉)
×1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)b(|00〉+ |11〉)34 1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)c(|00〉+ |11〉)56
7) Bob and Charlie take qubits 4 and 6 and act on the these
states by operations Cb4 and Cc6. The common state can be
writhen as:
1√
2
(|0〉a|q〉+ |1〉a|1 + q〉)
×1
2
{(|00〉+ |11〉)b3|0〉4 + (|01〉+ |10〉)b3|1〉4}
×1
2
{(|00〉+ |11〉)c5|0〉6 + (|01〉+ |10〉)c5|1〉6}
FIG. 2: A F-type attack on BK protocol for quantum encryption
of keys. (a) Alice, Bob ad Charlie previously shared entangled
state |GHZ〉abc among themselves. (b) Eve can transform pre-
viously shared entangled state |GHZ〉abc to three Bell states of
|Ψi〉ae1 |Ψi〉be2 |Ψi〉ce3 , among herself and parties, then, she can take
all of keys that Alice sends to Bob and Charlie.
8) Bob and Charlie do a measurement on the qubits 4 and
6 in the z basis (|0〉, |1〉), and identify these types of keys
together. With the probability of one-half, the above state re-
duces to:
for q = 0
(|0〉a|0〉+ |1〉a|1〉)(|00〉+ |11〉)b3(|00〉+ |11〉)c5
(|0〉a|0〉+ |1〉a|1〉)(|01〉+ |10〉)b3(|01〉+ |10〉)c5
for q = 1
(|0〉a|1〉+ |1〉a|0〉)(|00〉+ |11〉)b3(|01〉+ |10〉)c5
(|0〉a|1〉+ |1〉a|0〉)(|01〉+ |10〉)b3(|00〉+ |11〉)c5
Thus, Eve separately shares her qubit in a maximally entan-
gled states with Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s. Before going
to the next round of QKD, we would like attention following
relation for the above states for q = 0, 1, we have:
H ⊗H ⊗H(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉) = |000〉+ |111〉
H ⊗H ⊗H(|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉) = |000〉 − |111〉
9and
H ⊗H(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉) = (|00〉+ |11〉)
H ⊗H(|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉) = (|00〉 − |11〉)
Thus, for odd sequence bits q3, q5, ... Eve gets the same bits
that Alice sent (for each cases q = 0, 1). and for even se-
quence bits q4, q6, ... Eve gets the bits q4, q6, ... (q4 + 1, q6 +
1, ... ) for q = 0(q = 1). On the other hand, Bob and Charlie
get precisely the same sequence of bits that Alice sent for all
rounds of the QKD. Although, after parties’ communication
in the general channel for test of security, Eve can recognize
appropriate keys. This approach has an interesting property
that Eve can get all of the secret keys with probability one
half (the same as in the case of ZLG protocol). In other words,
the probability doesn’t increase with going from two to three
parties.
In what follows, we would like to repair the BK protocol by
using higher dimensional GHZ states. The new protocol that
we suggest is similar to our previous approach to the ZLG
protocol. We consider a generalization of the GHZ state to
a D dimensional system which was previously shared among
the parties. This is the state define as:
|Ψodd〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j〉abc (24)
Alice wants to send the sequence of classical bits q1, q2, ...
(qi = 0, 1) to Bob and Charlie. She prepares the state |q, q〉12
corresponding to q1 and operates with controlled gatesUc(a1)
andUc(a2) (previously defined at eq. (12)) on them, to the get
the state:
|Ψodd〉 = 1√
D


∑
jeven=0
|j, j, j〉abc|q, q〉12
+
∑
jodd=1
|j, j, j〉abc|q + 1, q + 1〉12


(25)
and she sends a coded state to Bob and Charlie. At the destina-
tion, Bob and Charlie act on this state by the controlled gates
Uc(b1) and Uc(c2) and extract the state |q, q〉12 (for further
convenience, we restrict our selves to particles with even di-
mensionD = 2d). Hence, for the even bits which are encoded
as state |q〉 (similar to BK protocol), parties apply Hadamard
transformation to D-dimensional GHZ state which we denote
by
H ⊗H ⊗H |Ψodd〉
= |Ψeven〉 = 1
D
D−1∑
l1,l2,l3=0
∆(li, D)|l1, l2, l3〉abc
In the above equation ∆(li, D) = δ(
∑3
i=1 li) + δ(
∑3
i=1 li −
D) + δ(
∑3
i=1 li − 2D). Thus, Alice entangles the state |q〉 to
the shared state |Ψeven〉 by performing only one single con-
trolled gate Uc(a1) to produce:
1
D


D−1∑
leven
1
,l2,l3=0
∆(li, D)|l1, l2, l3〉abc|q〉 (26)
+
D−1∑
lodd
1
,l2,l3=0
∆(li, D)|l1, l2, l3〉abc|q + 1〉


At the destination, Bob and Charlie act on this state by the
operators Uc(b1) and Uc(c2) and extract |q〉12. noting that
H2 6= 1 for D > 2, Alice and Bob must operate H∗ in the
next round of the protocol.
If in the intermediate step of eq. (25), Eve intercepts the
first sending qubits and performs a measurement on them,
then, the GHZ state reduces to:
|Φeven〉 =
√
2
D
∑
jeven=0
|j, j, j〉abc (27)
or
|Φodd〉 =
√
2
D
∑
jodd=1
|j, j, j〉abc (28)
If Alice, Bob and Charlie apply Hadamard gate on the their
particle states, for example |φeven〉, we have:
H∗ ⊗H∗ ⊗H∗|ψ〉 =
D−1∑
h1,h2,h3=0
∆(hi, d)|h1, h2, h3〉abc
In the above equation ∆(hi, d) = δ(
∑3
i=1 hi) +
δ(
∑3
i=1 hi − d) + δ(
∑3
i=1 hi − 2d) + δ(
∑3
i=1 hi − 3d) +
δ(
∑3
i=1 hi − 4d) + δ(
∑3
i=1 hi − 5d). Thus, Eve can’t dis-
entangled Alice, Bob and Charlie states and we deduce that
F-attack doesn’t apply to this approach It can be shown that
for every round of the protocol, parties have a chance to de-
tect Eve’s operation. Eve can only entangle her state with
Alice and Bob states and she wishes that after her operation,
the parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, can not detect her effects.
This strategy is the same as the GGWZ [24] attack, we showed
to be removable easily.
One of interesting results of our extension is that our proto-
col can simply be extended to higher dimension QKD between
Alice , Bob and Charlie, by using quantum key encoding and
decoding classical information.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Paper, we review ZLG, KBB and BK protocols for
QKD via quantum encryption and show that these protocols
are not secure. Thus, Eve has always a chance to be informed
of her parties’ keys without being detected by them. That is,
we have shown that the security conditions are a necessary
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condition but not a sufficient one, specially in the QKD with
orthogonal states.
For the sake of completeness we briefly described the be-
havior of the presented schemes on efficiency of the transmis-
sion. We consider the definition give by Cabello [15]. The
efficiency of a QKD protocol, ε, is defined as:
ε =
bs
qt + bt
, (29)
where bs is the expected number of secret bits received by
Bob, qt is the number of qubits used in the quantum chan-
nel, and bt is the number of bits used in the classical channel
between Alice and Bob. Since in our scheme no classical in-
formation is needed in the message-coding, we have bt = 0.
This together with bs = 1 and qt = 1 leads to ε = 1.
However, the practical efficiency takes into account chan-
nel’s transmittance as well [17]. In our protocol (ZLG pro-
tocol with higher dimensional Bell states) a qubit travels for
a distance L, L being the separation between Alice and Bob.
If τ is the transmittance of the qubit over a distance L, after
traveling the distance L and the operation of Bob, he takes
measurement on the carrier particle. Thus, the practical effi-
ciency can be evaluated as ε′ = ετ3 = τ3. By comparison,
in BB84 it is ε′ = (1/6)τ , because bs = 0.5, qt = 1 and
bt = 2, and a qubit travels a distance L. This implies that the
presented scheme is more efficient than BB84, provided the
transmittance of the channel is τ >
√
1/6. It is also possible
to see that ours practical efficiency is more efficient than M.
Lucamarini and S. Mancini protocol [18] if τ >
√
1/2 and
that the entanglement-based scheme [17] contains a factor τ6,
making it lower than ours [25].
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